Week 12 Notes:
Preface to *PG* and the *Science of Logic*

Introduction:

For the conclusion of the course, I am asking you to read the abridged version of *A Spirit of Trust*.
It consists of the *Introduction* and the *Conclusion*.
That is the sandwich bread without the meat:
the view without the argument or connection to Hegel's text.
  That is book-length: not a particularly short book, but an ordinary-sized book.
The discussion of the *Preface* to the *Phenomenology*, which is the first part of today's class, is in that *Conclusion*.

The discussion of the *Science of Logic* is not addressed in *A Spirit of Trust.*
  The decision *not* to hold the book hostage to my writing the envisaged chapter on the *Science of Logic* is what made it possible for me actually to finish the book.
Beginning today, after I talk about the *Preface*, I'll begin to sketch what might have been on offer in that phantom, still-unwritten supplementary chapter.

Part 1. *Preface* to *Phenomenology*:

...everything turns on grasping and expressing the True not only as *Substance*, but equally as *Subject*. At the same time it is to be observed that substantiality embraces the universal, or **the *immediacy of knowledge* itself, as well as that which is *being* or immediacy *for* knowledge.** [17] [BB: Cf. [18], [25], [32], [37], [39], [54], and [65].]
This is the overall claim of the *Preface*—the one we will be unpacking throughout.
"The True" is the *relation* between objective and subjective forms of the *Begriff* (conceptual content). The objective side is Substance and the subjective side is Subject.
Note that "substance" also has a use on the side of subjects, in which it is the community.
Substance as the recognitive community is also in a contrastive relation with individual *Subjects*, but here, too, that disparity is an essential part of a larger *unity*.

Further, **the living Substance is being which is in truth *Subject***, or what is the same, is in truth actual only in so far as it is the **movement** of positing itself, or is **the mediation of its self-othering** with itself. **This Substance is, as Subject, pure, *simple negativity*,** and is for this very reason **the bifurcation of the simple**; it is the doubling which sets up opposition.

Only **this self-*restoring* sameness**, or this **reflection in otherness within itself**—not an *original* or *immediate* unity as such—is the True. **It is the process of its own becoming, the circle that presupposes its end as its goal, having its end also as its beginning; and only by being worked out to its end, is it actual**. [18]

The "movement of positing itself" is experience as recollected, instituting the relations between objectivity and subjectivity, which accordingly is "the mediating of its self-othering with itself."

The True (the relation between the two poles of the intentional nexus) is the experiential-recollective "process of its own becoming."

The end is the represented reality that becomes explicitly *to* and *for* consciousness what things are *implicitly*, *an sich*, *in themselves* is presupposed as having all along implicitly governed the process of experience that is recollectively recapitulated and reconstructed.

In that sense it is presupposed (as having been implicit).

But the achievement of *explicit* awareness of the object *as* presupposed is the *result* of the recollective-reconstructive phase of experience.

T.S. Eliot in "Little Gidding":

"We shall not cease from **exploration**. And the **end of all our exploring** will be to arrive where we started. And know the place for the first time."

The True is the whole. But the whole is nothing other than the essence consummating itself through its development...

For mediation is nothing beyond self-moving selfsameness, or is reflection into self, **the moment of the 'I' which is for itself pure negativity or, when reduced to its pure abstraction,** *simple becoming*. **The 'I', or becoming in general**, this mediation, on account of its simple nature, is just **immediacy in the process of becoming**, and is the immediate itself. [21]

The **essence** is the norm, and it "consummates itself through its development" by being made explicit "through its development" as the attitudes adopted in the process of experience are rationally reconstructed through recollection.

This is the process of "mediating immediacy," giving what merely presents itself ("immediately" in the sense of noninferentially as to its origin) specifically *conceptual* form, which is to say inferentially articulated, "mediated" form.

This is also giving **contingency** the normative form of **necessity**.

He adds the thought here that what it is to be a self or subject, an 'I' *is* to engage in this process of experience (including its recollective rectification), for one's attitudes to develop, *change* and *become*, in this specific recollective way.

Realizing that, becoming that *for* ourselves, is achieving the new, finally adequate sort of theoretical self-consciousness he calls "Absolute Knowing."

At this point for the first time, what we all along have been *in* ourselves, implicitly, *an sich*, is what we are *for* ourselves.

Already something thought, the **content** is the property of **substance**; existence [Dasein] has no more to be changed into the form of what is in-itself and implicit [Ansichseins], but **only the <u>implicit</u>—no longer merely something primitive, nor lying hidden within existence, but already present as a recollection—into the form of what is <u>explicit</u>, of what is objective to self** [Fürsichseins]. [29]

This is the clearest case of Hegel just saying explicitly what I have been saying he is saying.

But the Life of Spirit is not the life that shrinks from death and keeps itself untouched by devastation, but rather the life that endures it and maintains itself in it. **It wins its truth only when, in utter dismemberment, it finds itself**.

It is this power, not as something positive...On the contrary, **Spirit is this power only by looking the negative in the face and tarrying with it**. This **tarrying with the negative** is the magical power that converts it [the negative] into being. This power is identical with what we earlier called **the Subject, which by giving determinateness an existence in its own element supersedes abstract immediacy**, i.e. the immediacy which barely is, and thus is **authentic substance: that being or immediacy whose mediation is not outside of it but which is this mediation itself**. [32]

He also says:

The disparity which exists in consciousness between the 'I' and the substance which is its object is the distinction between them, the *negative* in general. [37]

"The negative" is immediacy in its role as recalcitrant to mediation, as a permanent source of instability in every constellation of determinate empirical concepts—as the perennial and perennially renewed motor of cognitive error and practical failure that prospectively drives the changes of attitudes that are rationally reconstructed, put into an expressively progressive form, by recollection.

The power of the negative "drives" those changes of attitudes in the dual sense of
a) normatively requiring change of attitude and
b) being what actually causes them, in a subjunctively robust way.

...**experience is the name we give to just this movement**, in which the immediate, the unexperienced, i.e. the abstract, whether it be of sensuous [but still unsensed] being, or only thought of as simple, becomes alienated from itself and then returns to itself from this alienation, and is only then revealed for the first time in its actuality and truth, just as it then has become a property of consciousness also. [36]

What we see here is the dual, temporally biperspectival character of the process of experience:

i. Prospectively, what now appears as the cycle of cognition-and-action (or, equivalently, since it is a repeating cycle, the cycle of action-and-cognition)—a notion enriched from that of the *Introduction*—yields the experience of cognitive error and practical failure.

ii. That motivates and sets criteria of adequacy for the retrospective recollective, rational reconstructive phase, which remakes the past into an expressively progressive history or tradition that is norm-governed in a dual (deontic/alethic) sense.

The disparity which exists in consciousness between the 'I' and the substance which is its object is the distinction between them, the *negative* in general.
...**Now although this negative appears at first as a disparity between the 'I' and its object, it is just as much the disparity of the substance with itself.**
Thus what seems to happen outside of it, to be an activity directed against it, is really its own doing, and Substance shows itself to be essentially Subject.
Being is then absolutely mediated; it is a substantial content which is just as immediately the property of the 'I', it is self-like or the Notion.
With this the Phenomenology of Spirit is concluded. [37]
We can now see that recollection takes what seems to *happen to us*, the errors and failures we experience, and turns it into something *done by us*.
This recollective activity, a phase of our experience, is the essence of the conceptual.
And it is of the essence of our self-hood.
The conceptual thereby shows itself to be "self-like."
This is what I call "conceptual idealism."

To know something falsely means that there is a disparity between knowledge and its Substance. But **this very disparity is the process of distinguishing in general, which is an essential moment [in knowing]. Out of this distinguishing...comes their identity, and this resultant identity is the truth...Disparity, rather, as the negative, the self, is itself still directly present in the True as such.** [39]

This truth therefore includes the negative also, what would be called the false, if it could be regarded as something from which one might abstract. T**he evanescent itself must, on the contrary, be regarded as essential, not as something fixed, cut off from the True... Appearance is the arising and passing away that does not itself arise and pass away**, but is in itself, and constitutes actuality and the movement of the life of truth.
The True is thus a vast Bacchanalian revel, with not a one sober;
yet because each member collapses as soon as he drops out, the revel is just as much transparent and simple repose. Judged in the court of this movement, the single shapes of

Spirit do not persist **any more than determinate thoughts do**, but they are as much positive and necessary moments, as they are negative and evanescent.

In the *whole* of the movement, seen as a state of repose, what distinguishes itself therein, and gives itself particular existence, is preserved as something that *recollects* itself, whose existence is self-knowledge, and whose self-knowledge is just as immediately existence. [47] The negative, the false, mere appearance are essential to the recollective experiential process that is the True, which both establishes and becomes aware of the intentional nexus. Recollection.

Science dare only organize itself by the life of the Notion itself. The **determinateness**, which is taken from the schema and externally attached to an existent thing, **is**, in Science, **the self-moving soul of the realized content**. The **movement** of a being that **immediately** is, consists partly in **becoming** an **other** than itself, and thus becoming its own immanent **content**; partly in **taking back into itself this unfolding** [of its **content**] or this existence of it, i.e. in making *itself* into a moment, and **simplifying** itself into something **determinate**. In the former movement, *negativity* is the **differentiating** and positing of *existence*; in this **return** into self, it is the becoming of the *determinate simplicity*.

It is in this way that the **content** shows that its **determinateness** is not received from something else, nor externally attached to it, but that it determines itself, and ranges itself as a moment having its own place in the whole. [53]

Determinateness is both the product of the recollective experiential process of acknowledging and repairing error and its motor.

The determinateness seems at first to be due entirely to the fact that it is related to an *other*, and its movement seems imposed on it by an alien power; but having its otherness within itself, and being self-moving, is just what is involved in the simplicity of thinking itself; for this simple thinking is the self-moving and self-differentiating thought. It is its own inwardness, it is the pure Notion. Thus common thought [Verständigkeit] too is a becoming, and, as this becoming, it is *reason*ableness [Vernünftigkeit].[55]

The immediacy that confers determinateness through the unmasking of appearance in error is not something imposed from outside the experiential process but to be understood (sense-dependence, not reference-dependence) in terms of the essential role it plays in that process. Reconceiving everything in terms of its role in this recollective experiential process is what takes us from metacategories of *Verstand* to metacategories of *Vernunft*.

...in speculative [begreifenden] thinking, as we have already shown, **the negative belongs to the content itself**, and is the *positive,* both as the *immanent* **movement** and determination of the **content**, and as the whole of this **process**.

Looked at as a result, **what emerges from this process is the *determinate* negative** which is consequently a positive content as well. [59]

Speculative [begreifendes] thinking behaves in a different way. Since **the Notion is the object's own self, which presents itself as the *coming-to-be of the object***, it is not a passive Subject inertly supporting the Accidents; it is, on the contrary, **the self-moving Notion which takes its determinations back into itself**. In this movement the passive Subject itself perishes; **it enters into the differences and the content, and constitutes the determinateness, i.e. the differentiated content and its movement, instead of remaining inertly over against it**. The solid ground which argumentation has in the passive Subject is therefore shaken**, and only this movement itself becomes the object.** [60]

BB: Absolute knowing, like Buddhist enlightenment, does not change the cycloid path traced out on the wheel of experience. One still makes cognitive errors and suffers practical failures. The difference is just that now one has an adequate set of metaconcepts for making explicit what is happening: what one is doing and what is going on. The difference resides at the level of self-consciousness. Doing things in this sense *mindfully* is being able to be aware of what one is doing. This can have massive practical effects, as when awareness of what one is implicitly recognitively committed to by engaging in discursive practices at all obliges and (so motivates) us to institute (actualize) recognitive communities that more perfectly satisfy those implicit commitments.

Part 2. *The Science of Logic*:

1. What is the science of logic?

Hegel gives the term three principal senses:
  a) The **book**, *The Science of Logic*, divided into three parts:
     i. The logic of Being (*Seinslogik*)
     ii. The logic of Essence and Appearance (*Wesenslogik*), but also the progression from *Sein* to *Schein*, Being to Appearance.
     iii. The logic of the Concept (*Begriffslogik*).
  b) The science of logic as a **result**:
     The final structure of fully expressively adequate metaconcepts (categories) that emerges at the end of that book.
     The organization of those metaconcepts, the ultimate metacategorial structure is the science of logic.
     It is what shows up in *PG* as categories having the structure of *Vernunft* (rather than *Verstand*)
  c) The science of logic as an expressively progressive *process* from
     i. the simplest, crudest metacategorial structure, the idea of how things just immediately objectively are (**Being**),
     ii. through a metacategorial structure that distinguishes how things *actually* are from how they merely *might* be, understanding *actuality* as essentially contrasting with a wider sphere of *possibility* (being embedded in an alethic *modal* structure) (**Essence**), which has as another side of the same coin the distinction between *appearance* (**Schein**) and *reality*.
       Here the distinction between **actuality/possibility**, on the *objective* side, is lined up with the distinction on the *subjective* side between **reality/appearance** and the experience of error (as taking what is merely possible to be actual) and failure (not practically progressing from possibility to actuality).
       to
     iii. The *conceptual* structure common to objectivity and subjectivity, *Begrifflichkeit*.
       Here we have bimodal hylomorphic conceptual realism.
       This culminates in the Idea.
     Rehearsing this progression is the *activity* or *process* that is the science of logic.
     That rehearsal is a doing that is a *recollection*.
     Its *result* is the final distinctively structured constellation (a metacategorial structure) of fully expressively adequate metaconcepts, which is the science of logic in sense (b).

Reminder that I use the term "*vocabularies*" in the Quinean-Wittgensteinian sense.
This is the successor conception, once we no longer make a principled distinction between language and theory, meaning and belief, because we have appreciated the *practical* interdependence of these categories—themselves derived from artificial logical calculi—for natural languages.

2. <u>From Kant to the *Science of Logic*</u>:

Kant had the idea of categorial metaconcepts: concepts defined by their playing the distinctive expressive role, not of articulating empirical judgments in cognition and practical intentions (endorsement of maxims) in action, but of articulating the conceptual *framework* that makes empirical cognition and action possible.
This is one of the axial, founding insights, not only of Kant's own thought, but of the tradition of German idealism he founded. (A second is the connection between *reason,* and positive *freedom* construed as the capacity to bind oneself by norms.)

Hegel radicalizes that categorial insight in three ways:
α) He considers the possibility of *different* categorial structures.
β) He construes these as different *metacategorial* constellations of categorial metaconcepts.
This is turning the crank Kant turned, one more time: distinguishing not just
Ground-level concepts and categorial metaconcepts,
But also a *third*, *higher* level:
*Meta*categorial meta-metaconcepts.
δ) He sees the possibility of recollectively arranging these different structures in an expressive progression, in a way modeled on his (final) understanding of how the contents of ground-level empirical/practical concepts are determined.
This latter move is regularized and systematized in the book, the *Science of Logic*.

<u>In the *Phenomenology*</u>:
Hegel:
> A. Sees that there can be *different* sets of categorial metaconcepts, different ways of understanding cognition, normative self-hood, and agency,
> Note: I use the phrase "categorial metaconcepts" to describe the second level of Hegel's tripartite hierarchy because I want to leave room for the possibility that not all metaconcepts play the categorial, framework-explicating role that Kant identified.
> For instance, purely *syntactic* metaconcepts, such as <u>word</u>, (but *not* <u>sentence</u>—since language must have sentences, and subsentential *features*, but these need not be correlated with sentential sub*parts.)*

8

B.   Rehearses a *progression* from less expressively adequate constellations of categorial metaconcepts, those having the static structure (presupposing the *metaproperty* of *determinateness* of ground-level concepts) he calls "*Verstand*," to more expressively adequate constellations of categorial metaconcepts, those having the dynamic recollective structure (explaining the *process of determination* of ground-level concepts) he calls "*Vernunft*."

These amount to thinking about the *metacategorial* concepts Kant uses, such as <u>intuition</u> (immediacy) and <u>concept</u> (mediation), and realizing that there are different ways of understanding *them* and their relations to one another.

 In the *Science of Logic*:

Hegel moves beyond the two-stage metacategorial structures of *Verstand/Vernunft* to a *three*-stage picture in which he rehearses, rationally reconstructs, recollects an expressive progression from

    i.   initially crude metacategorial (so, *meta*-metaconceptual) structures (*Sein*, Being), immediacy.

    ii.   through a less crude one (*Schein*, Essence, distinguishing necessity and possibility as the context in which actuality is understood, endorsement as essentially involving the possibility of error, reality/appearance), to

    iii.   A final, potentially adequate one: *Begriff*.

Within each of these we find sub-cases, themselves increasing in expressive adequacy.

As is the case with the recollective process that governs determinate empirical and practical, ground-level concepts, the progression through ever-more-expressively-adequate metacategorial discerns each latter stage as unpacking, making explicit some essential feature that is recollected as having been implicit in, presupposed by, the earlier stage.

He ascends into a meta-metaconceptual heaven, by seeing that the first, crudest way to understand what one is doing in engaging in empirical and practical discursive activity (cognition and action) at the ground level can begin with the idea that one is knowing how things *actually* are, making things *actually* be some way.

This takes determinateness for granted, as *immediacy* (what things are *in* themselves).

This is the first metacategorial structure.

Then one sees that such attitudes, such a way of understanding what one is doing in knowing and acting, makes sense only if how things *actually* are is contrasted with how things *might possibly* be (but are not), and acknowledging the possibility that how one takes things *actually* to be might deliver only an *appearance* (mis-taking something merely possible for actual), and not reality.

Seeing these two, alethic modal possibility/actuality and epistemic-deontic appearance/reality (so implicating the experience of error and failure) as two sides of one coin then moves to the idea of

the *Begriff*: the conceptual structure common to the objective realm of possibilities and actualities and the subjective realm of endorsement and rejection.

3. <u>**Transition back to the final stage of the process of unfolding the science of logic:**</u>

But to do that, we need not consider the contents of any *actual* ground-level concepts.
We are just looking at the progression from less to more expressively adequate *metacategorial* structures, constellations of *meta*-metaconcepts.
That progression owes *nothing* to how *anything* actually is, or *any* thoughts anyone actually has, nor indeed, to what is really *possible* and *impossible*.
It is at a higher, more abstract level than that.
This is what Hegel means when he says in the Preface to the *Science of Logic* that what he doing is "rehearsing God's thoughts before the creation."
"Rehearsing" is recollecting.
"*God's* thoughts" because the distinction between subjective and objective, thoughts and facts, is itself part of what is being articulated.
"Thoughts" in the sense of think*ables*, not of think*ings*.
"Before the creation" because the relative expressive adequacy of various metacategorial frameworks does not depend at all on how things actually are, or what is really possible or impossible.
This is a radicalization of what Kant means by "a priori".
Kant meant that there were no *particular* empirical concepts one needed to master, nor judgments one needed to endorse, in order to grasp these concepts—*not* that one could grasp *a priori* (it is an adverb, not an adjective) such concepts without having grasped *any* concepts at all, or made *any* empirical judgments at all.

It is remarkable that Hegel thinks that *one* sort of story, whose core is *reasoning as recollecting*, accounts for the determinate conceptual contents of all three levels of concepts:
- ground-level empirical and practical concepts,
- categorial metaconcepts (such as particular/universal and immediate/mediated), and
- metacategorial meta-metaconcepts (such as Being, Essence, and *Begriff*).

In adopting this view, Hegel moves beyond semantic *inferentialism* to a further kind of *historical* understanding of content in terms of role in reasoning, where reasoning is now modeled not on drawing conclusions from premises, but on the three phase process whose final stage is *recollection*.

Q: Why does he think that this common structure applies at all three levels?
A: Because according to the final constellation of metacategories, the Absolute Idea, the constellation of metaconcepts that articulates the historically biperspectival process of

recollective rationality is the final, fully expressively adequate, and so *correct* way of understanding the determinate contents of *all* concepts.

Further, he thinks this because he thinks we can find the one, unique, finally correct because maximally expressively adequate constellation of metacategories (the science of logic as a *result* or an achievement) by elaborating them from the poorest-and-purest, crude constellation of metacategories that takes them to be *immediate*: what there is and what we think (our commitments). This is the science of logic as the *process* that is recounted in the *narrative* that is *The Science of Logic*.

This view is, in another resonant phrase Hegel used about the science of logic (in all three senses) "**pure thought thinking itself**."

4. <u>**The Idea as the final form of metacategories of the Concept:**</u>

<u>A disclaimer about not here discussing to the next level of fine structure of the *Science of Logic*:</u>

I am not going to be addressing the crucial question that any reader of the *Science of Logic* must face, and which primarily distinguishes different readings of it.

That is the question of how to rationalize (recollectively rationally vindicate) the various ways Hegel characterizes the three grand stages of metacategorial development from Being through Essence, to Concept (whose final stage is the Idea):

a)
i) In-itself
ii) For itself, or for another,
iii) In-and-for itself.
b)
i) Particularity
ii) Universality
iii) Individuality-Singularity

But I do think that the (meta-meta)conceptual resources to say how and why these line up are present already in the *Phenomenology*.

A tangential remark:

I believe that readers of **Peirce** have not sufficiently appreciated, explored, and exploited the sense in which he evidently thought of his metaphysical categories of "firstness," "secondness," and "thirdness" as successor-conceptions to Hegel's Being, Essence, and Concept, aiming to express what was right about Hegel's deployment of these metacategorical meta-metaconcepts in the *Science of Logic*.

Possibly this is because the evident difficulties of each thinker's thought in this area makes working out a detailed comparison and recollective assessment the philosophical version of what Shakespeare called "the bourne from which no man returneth."
In short, it seems empirically that anyone who starts thinking hard about Peircean thirdness is lost forever.

Even though I don't want to get into these details, for reasons that will become clear when I make my critical remarks, it is worth looking in just a bit more detail at *one* crucial conception:

From *Begriff* to Idea:

The key final transition of the *Science of Logic* is from *Begrifflichkeit* to the Idea.
Shaping question: What is the difference between the *Begriff* and the *Idea*?
Begriff is conceptual content.
Idea includes immediacy.
(Cf., in Kant, concept, and concept + intuition.)
The metacategorial structure Hegel calls the "Idea" includes the conception of the *temporally* biperspectival *process* of *determining* conceptual contents:
- Going forward, driven normatively by finding oneself with commitments incompatible by one's own lights, the cycle of cognition-and-action leading to cognitive *error* and practical *failure*.
- Looking backward, *recollectively* rationally reconstructing actual attitudes as *governed by norms* (in the dual deontic-alethic sense that the norms both provide standards for normative assessment of *correctness* of applications of concepts *and* are what the recollection, insofar as *it* is successful, shows those applications to have been subjunctively sensitive to.

The result of such a process of experience is an understanding of conceptual content as shared between subjective and objective poles, in the hylomorphism.
This is **hylomorphism as a form/*content* distinction.**
The Idea is the whole unity of subjective and objective, with the two forms as well as the conceptual content.
    In another register—**hylomorphism as a form/*matter* distinction**, the subjective and the objective are contents in the sense of *material immediacies* that are given different kinds of **conceptual form**. The two kinds of immediacy are:
    i.   **Actual being** (stubborn facts), the recalcitrant source of cognitive error and practical failure, and
    ii.   **actual commitments** (what one is actually committed to,), which constrains the development of one's constellation of commitments.

One of Hegel's fundamental ideas, as fundamental as that the *conceptual contents* that are the essentially mediated *form* of those contents (in this register) can be just the same in both cases, is that there is a notion of <u>immediacy</u> that is common to objective reality = actuality and prior actual commitments (what one inherits from one's previous self).

There is a crucial lesson to be learned from these two "registers" in which one can apply generally hylomorphic forms of explanation.
That lesson is what H means (a much bigger theme in *SL* than in *PG*) by denying the **form/matter** or **form/content** distinctions.
(He thinks Kant in one way ran these together, in another showed them to be separate, by taking judgment to involve both concepts and intuitions.
But in this sense, judgments *are* contentful concepts.)

Form/content vs. form/matter.
What H gets from or makes of K:
There are really *three* levels: something like matter, content, form.
H's version is particular, individual, universal.
The latter two are something like abstractions from the middle one.
That is the theory of (conceptual) content I see as at the center of Hegel's enterprise.

Key here is to explain H's final conception by the *dual* applications of the hylomorphic explanatory structure:
   a) subjective and objective two forms of one (conceptual) *content*.
   b) The conceptual (*das Begriff*) as the form of mediation (negation), which is given determinateness by its relation to *matter* as immediacy. Immediacy in turn has two forms (flavors?): subjective and objective, being=actuality and *actual* commitments. The Idea, as it goes beyond the *Begriff*, articulates this thought.
<u>Immediacy</u> is now understood, not itself *immediately* (as it is at the metacategorial level of Being), but *functionally*, as a role with respect to mediation that, each in its own way, we can see played by something from the side of the object (the *actuality* we are talking and thinking *about*) and something from the side of the subject (our *actual* commitments and conceptions, acts of applying concepts).
The Idea incorporates the *determinateness* of what is judgeable/possible, articulated by relations of determinate negation (or material incompatibility: see section on determinate negation below) and mediation (consequence or implication), as both objective and subjective *immediacy*.
But now <u>immediacy</u> is not understood, or taken to be understood, *immediately*.
Rather, we think about the *functional explanatory role* played by the status of *immediacy*.
We think about the *work* that metaconcept (category), <u>immediacy</u> is doing in the recollective process of *determining* conceptual contents.

We do that by getting clear about the recollective process by which the contents of ground-level concepts are determined.

The fact that cognition and action are discussed under the heading of "the Idea" shows that the application of determinate, ground-level concepts is in fact a topic.
Eventually see that it is the whole *cycle* of cognition-and-action (perception-thought-action-perception of results of action) that is the context for both.
It is true that cognition occurs only in pursuit of *some* practical aim.
But this is not the principal point. (Cf. the remarks about semantic vs. stereotypical pragmatism.)

5. <u>Sketch of a Program for a Critical Reading of the *Science of Logic*:</u>

There are reasons why I prefer the *Phenomenology* to the *Science of Logic*.
I see the *Science of Logic* as in many ways taking a wrong turn from the ideas of the *Phenomenology*.
I think I can see how Hegel saw the move as progress, and why he was excited by it.
But I think it incorporates two important mistakes.
So I would want to develop the early ideas in a different direction.
(Note: I think similar things about the development from early Frege to later Frege (*Begriffsschrift* and *Grundlagen* to *Grundgesetze*), Michael Dummett, and in many ways, Sellars.
I think the things they picked up from their early work to develop, and the direction they developed them, are not the most progressive path from those early writings.
Coincidence?
I do think the move from the early to the later Wittgenstein was wholly progressive.)

<u>First critical emendation:</u>

This whole story could be told while withholding endorsement of, and so dividing through by Hegel's commitment to, the claim that **the constellation of metacategories he arrives at** in and as the "science of logic" *is **fully and finally expressively adequate*** to understanding the conceptual content of both all categorial metaconcepts and all possible ground-level empirical and practical concepts.

      Almost everything I have attributed to him concerning the relations between the three levels would still make sense and be defensible if we took it that, like ground-level empirical and practical concepts, the evolution of categorial metaconcepts and metacategorial meta-metaconcepts was open-ended and never-ending, subject in principle to indefinite improvement—and so divided through by Hegel's contrary claim.

Making that emendation is my first suggestion for a *critical* appropriation of Hegel's ground-breaking insight and proudest achievement, namely his conception of recollective rationality and the historically biperspectival account of the process of determining conceptual content and instituting its representational dimension.

      All of the elements I have identified as centrally articulating his Absolute Idealism would still be sustainable in this critically amended context: bimodal hylomorphic conceptual realism, objective idealism and conceptual idealism.

      We would have to jettison the "God's thoughts before the creation" conceit.
But I think that is just as well.
That is an expression of his conception of the *systematicity* of philosophical thought and method—what Paul Franks calls the commitment to explain "**All or Nothing At All**."

As I want to conceive things, the recollective process of expressing explicitly what is then retrospectively discernible as having been all along implicit has no natural or necessary stopping-place.

The grooming and refining of metaconceptual tools for doing so is an infinite process, and so is the improvement of self-consciousness that results.

For there is no end to the aspects of discursive practice we can make explicit, the better to understand it.

And no reason to think that the metacategorial structures of such accounts are drawn from a fixed finite stock, settled in advance.

Closer to the ground, there is, for instance, no end to the sequence of conditionals we can introduce to make explicit different senses of "implies" or "follows from."

(Manfred Frank argues that rejection of the idea of a first principle and a final system is what distinguishes the early Romantics from the German Idealists.

Insofar as that is right, I am with the Frühromantiker.)

<u>Second critical emendation:</u>

There is a second critical emendation that I recommend, that does *not* leave everything important intact to nearly the same extent, however.

This is to deny that the conceptual content of metaconcepts (including metacategorial meta-metaconcepts) *is* of a piece with the content of ground-level concepts.

The key point, as I see it, is that there is no vocabulary that stands to ground-level empirical and practical vocabulary as that kind of vocabulary stands to the categorial metavocabularies we use to specify the *use*, and *so* the conceptual *contents* (this is force→content semantic pragmatism rather than practical→theoretical stereotypical pragmatism).

      The fact that categorial metaconcepts play a distinctive expressive role with respect to the use and content of the concepts for which they *are* metaconcepts gives us another way to think about *their* use and content—a way that is *not* available (by definition) for ground-level concepts. **It gives us another pragmatist route from *use* to *content* (pragmatics to semantics):**

From the use of *one* (base) vocabulary to the content of *another* (meta)vocabulary.

      We can understand the use and (so) the content of categorial metaconcepts and metacategorial meta-metaconcepts "**from below**," as it were: from what they let us say about the use and content of the concepts whose use and content they explicate.

      This "raw material" is different from the *immediacy* that ground-level concepts mediate and so make explicit in that it is already fully conceptualized. It is not *just* playing the functional

role of a source of friction and recalcitrance, the source of error and failure in the application of concepts at the *same* level.

It does do that *too*, and that is what makes it possible to see some constellations of metaconceptual categories and metacategories as more expressively adequate than others. And that is what is right about Hegel's continuing to think about the categories and metacategories as elements of recollective expressively progressive discursive traditions.

But unlike ground-level concepts, that is not *all* there is to the use and content of metaconcepts.

And, I want to claim, we can use that expressive surplus, which is the essence of the use and (so) content of categorial metaconcepts and metacategorial meta-metaconcepts to understand them.
We also use it to understand the notion of <u>expressive progress</u> that guides recollection of their development. And this, too, has no analogue at the ground level.

The recollective process of retrospectively rationally reconstructing an expressively progressive trajectory through the actual uses of categorial metaconcepts and metacategorial meta-metaconcepts *is* still *a* route that takes us from their *use* to their *content*. Again, that is what is right about Hegel's assimilation of all three levels to the same recollective model. But their *use* is crucially *different* from the use of ground-level concepts. And that means that the (meta)conceptual *content* that is further determined and articulated by the recollective process is different, too.

What is common to the two cases is **semantic pragmatism**: content is to be understood in terms of use (force), what one does in applying concepts in judgment *and* intention.
(Contrast this with stereotypical pragmatism: the explanatory priority of the practical over the cognitive.)
Here a key point to realize is that **pragmatism** in *both* is not primacy of practical over theoretical (which is a mere derivative consequence), but explanatory priority of *force* (what one is *doing*) over *content*.
That is, what is *mis*taken as the explanatory priority of *doing* over *knowing* ('pragmatism' in *one* sense) is really the priority of *doing* over the *content* of *both* knowing and doing.
This is 'pragmatism' in *another* sense.
The first is *stereotypical* pragmatism (which may, but need not, take the form of instrumentalism about cognitive norms), the second is *semantic* pragmatism.
Kant and Hegel, I claim, are *semantic* pragmatists, not *stereotypical* pragmatists. I want to say the same about Peirce (semantic), by contrast to James and Dewey (stereotypical).
In *SL*, the *doing* is "rehearsing the moments," that is, *recollection*.

In both cases, we can say that the path from use to content is broadly *functional*.
One looks to the role played by expressions in some *process* or *practice*, the norms that articulate its use in that context.

But how we go from use to content differs in the the two cases.

a) Ground-level: Here the model is that the process that takes us from use (actual applications of concepts) to content (the norms that govern those applications, in the dual sense of providing the normative standards for assessment of the correctness of applications and to which the process is claimed to be subjunctively sensitive) is the two-phase (prospective/retrospective) historically biperspectival experience.

      i. The cycle of cognition-and-action (use) yields commitments that are incompatible by the norms (content) one had understood as governing that use.

This the experience of error-and-failure.

It depends on the *first* sense of "determinate negation": material incompatibility.

It normatively obliges one (going forward) to *change* what one is doing.

      ii. *What* change one makes (the *second* sense of "determinate negation", appropriate to this retrospective phase, and derivative from and dependent on the first) is determined *recollectively*.

Here the process is not that of cognition-and-action (or action-and-cognition).

It is the process of *recollection*.

That is retrospectively rationally reconstructing the past as an expressively progressive *tradition*, turning it into a *history*, resolving prior incompatibilities by making distinctions, reconstructing it as the emergence into explicitness of coherent norms found to have been implicit all along.

      The development of this notion of retrospective recollective rationality is Hegel's particular lasting achievement and glory.

      As indicated, Hegel thinks this is the relation between actual *use* and the *norms* articulating conceptual *content* for concepts *generally*: at all three levels.

      But I claim (this is the second critical emendation I recommend), that the broadly functional pragmatic relation between use and content-articulating norms (determining what is incompatible with what—the first sense of "determinate negation"—and what is a consequence of what) is *different* in the case of categorial metaconcepts and metacategorial meta-metaconcepts than it is for ground-level empirical-practical concepts (the ones applied in the cycle of cognition-and-action or action-and-cognition).

For here the *use* that matters for determining the contents of concepts is *not* the use of that very metavocabulary. It is the use of the *underlying* vocabulary: the vocabulary for which it is a metavocabulary.

Here, too, the relation between use and content is *expressive* or *explicative*.

But the process one is explicating and finding norms governing is not the experience of the cycle of cognition-and-action.

It is the recollective process itself.

What one is making explicit is not the norms governing the use of the very vocabulary whose content one is interested in, but the norms governing the use of the different, prior

vocabulary for which the vocabulary in question (categorial or metacategorial) is a metavocabulary.

This sort of explication need *not* be recollective. (Hegel thinks it must.)

As a vocabulary that has conceptual content, it is, of course, subject to development by the experience of errors of application and the recollective rational reconstruction and normative rectification of it. Hegel is right about that.

But he ignores that there is *another* process of extracting norms of assessment to which the use of metavocabularies must be shown to be subjunctively sensitive.

That is the extent to which it gets its subject matter right: the use of the base vocabulary for which it is a metavocabulary.

This distinctive expressive role, this distinctive relation to the use of *another* vocabulary, gives us a further, different handle on the content of metaconcepts, another route for explicating their content.

For in addition to *their* use, they answer also to the use of the base vocabulary.

And it is in *those* terms that I propose to understand the contents categorial metavocabularies and metacategorial meta-metavocabularies, in keeping with the broadly functional, pragmatist explanatory strategy of moving from an account of the *use* of *some* vocabulary to the *content* of *a* vocabulary.

In the the ground-level, base case, the vocabulary whose use determines the conceptual contents of a vocabulary is the same one whose contents are determined.

In the categorial and metacategorial case, it is *also* the use of the vocabulary for which the vocabulary whose content is in question is a metavocabulary.

By exploiting this additional expressive resource, I think we can understand the categorial metaconcepts and metavocabulary without having to recollectively rehearse an expressively progressive trajectory through less adequate versions of them—which is what Hegel does in the bulk of the *Science of Logic*.

There is an alternate explanatory-explicative route, available exclusively for metavocabularies and the metaconcepts they express, in addition to the recollective one that looks only to the use of that very metavocabulary to articulate and explicate the metaconceptual contents it expresses.

Note that this story:

i. Retains the *semantic pragmatism* that seeks a broadly functionalist explanatory strategy for moving from use or force to content, from what is actually done to the norms that govern it in a dual deontic/alethic sense.

(By contrast to a stereotypical Fichtean pragmatism that consists in the explanatory priority of the practical over the cognitive.)

ii. Retains a role at both levels for recollective rationality, and so permits the understanding of the historical sense of "**determinate negation**" (of a later stage in the development-by-

determination relative to an earlier one) built on the sense of "determinate negation" that matters for the *first* phase of experience, the experience of cognitive error and practical failure.

Determinate Negation:
Dual sense of "determinate negation" already in the *Phenomenology*:
- i)   As material incompatibility.
- ii)   As the relation the product of recollection stands in to what is recollected: it is *different* from what is recollected, but also *expresses* it. It is a negation of it, but not a bare or formal one. It is a *determinate* negation. It is what the recollected material becomes when it is further *determined*, which involves *changing* (negating) it.

These two, in their difference and relation, are the origin of the two senses of "science of logic": as the **process** that is the application of the method, and as the ultimate **result** of that process. (That there *is* an *ultimate* result assumes H's view about the *finality* of metametaconcepts = metacategories, which my critical reading denies in its first suggested emendation. But that later stages in the temporally biperspectival process of experience are in this sense "determinate negations" of the earlier, less expressively adequate stages, does not.)

In suggesting this second emendation, I am breaking with Hegel more decisively than in the first case.
And further, this is a break that takes us back in Kant's direction ("**Zurück nach Kant**!").
For Kant had seen a fundamental difference in the expressive role of ground-level empirical and practical concepts and categorial metaconcepts.
He rigorously kept separate sets of books on them.

     Synthesizing a manifold of sensuous intuition into a constellation of concepts-and-commitments that exhibit the rational unity distinctive of apperception is quite a different expressive role from making explicit the forms of judgment and so the transcendental conditions of experience.

     By abstracting from Kant's notion of <u>intuition</u>, and construing his successor conception of <u>immediacy</u> *much* more broadly, *purely* in terms of the role immediacy plays in the process of mediating it, Hegel in the *SL* is able to assimilate the expressive roles of both kinds of concept, as well as the third level of metacategorial meta-metaconcepts that he adds on.

     The result he announces we have arrived at by the end of the *SL*, "pure thought thinking itself," "God's thoughts before the creation," is a *top-down* order of explanation, with lower-level concepts and metaconcepts understood functionally in terms of the role they play in the development of higher-level ones.

     In recommending a converse, *bottom-up* explanatory strategy (which I see as already helpful in understanding the *PG*, under the rubric of the hermeneutic method of "semantic descent") I am endorsing the Kantian distinction of expressive roles.

     This is a fundamental way in which my reading of Hegel is Kantian.
(Of course, my reading of Kant is noticeably Hegelian, too.)

This is built-in and explicitly avowed.

In this regard it is different from the charge—which has not explicitly been put this way yet by my critics, but which seems to me to be implicit in the dissatisfactions some have expressed—that my reading of the *Phenomenology* amounts to reconstructing Hegelian metacategories of *Vernunft* using only the resources of Kantian metacategories of *Verstand*.

Hegel: "**On he who looks rationally on the world, the world looks rationally back.**" "Looking rationally on the world" is acknowledging the magnanimous, forgiving, ultimately recognitive commitment to tell a recollective story that discerns a norm in actual applications of vocabulary—a norm that is *rationally* binding, in the sense that it articulates the content of a concept that determines what is a reason for what. Finding such a norm is "the world looking rationally back."